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PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS - AN
EXPANDED JUDICIAL ROLE
JAMES D. GHIARDI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Juries are often asked to award punitive damages with very limited gui-
dance from the courts.1 As a result, the punitive award, in a particular
instance, may be "capricious, undeserved and unrestrained." 2 When alleg-
edly excessive punitive damage awards become the focus of judicial scru-
tiny, courts grapple with the propriety of reducing those awards, as well as
with the question of to what extent they should be reduced.'
II. ROLE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
A. Is the Case an Appropriate One for Punitive Damages?
It is the responsibility of the trial judge, in the first instance, to deter-
mine whether the case is appropriate for punitive damages, i.e. whether the
question of punitive damages will be submitted to the jury.' The main focus
of that determination is the nature of the defendant's conduct. The trial
judge looks for evidence that the defendant acted intentionally, outra-
geously, recklessly or with conscious disregard for the rights of others.
Such conduct is generally deemed sufficiently egregious to warrant the im-
position of punitive damages. If the facts can support such a finding, the
punitive damage issue is allowed to go to the jury.' Once the question has
been submitted to the jury, the generally accepted rule is that the jury, in its
sole, unfettered discretion, determines whether to award punitive damages
and in what amount.' "It is the long settled and uniformly adhered to rule
in our jurisprudence that the amount of punitory or exemplary damages is
solely within the discretion of the jury, and, no matter what the sum of their
* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School, Milwaukee, WI. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of Ann M. Maher (J.D. 1988) while a third-year student at
Marquette University Law School.
1. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37, 49-50 (1983).
2. Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart Out of "Smart
Money, " 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 979, 997 (1986).
3. See Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987).
4. 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 18.04, at 13
(1987).
5. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
6. 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 18.04, at 13 n.l.
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finding might be, interference therewith, unless for exceptional causes, is
discouraged." 7
B. Instructing the Jury
In most jurisdictions,8 the jury is instructed, when deciding whether to
award punitive damages, that the purpose behind an award of punitive
damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to deter the wrongdoer and others
from engaging in similar conduct in the future.9 For example, the Wiscon-
sin Jury Instruction on punitive damages reads in part: "The purpose of
punitive damages is to punish a wrongdoer or deter the wrongdoer and
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. Punitive damages
are not awarded to compensate the plaintiff for any loss he has sustained."'
The award should serve those purposes - punishment and deterrence. If it
does not, or will not, an award of punitive damages is inappropriate.1
C. What Amount of Money Will It Take to Punish and Deter?
The jury is the sole judge of what amount is necessary to punish the
defendant.2 Once the jury has decided to award punitive damages, the
question becomes, how much money will it take to punish this defendant
and deter him and others from engaging in similar tortious conduct in the
future?13
The jury receives little guidance in determining a proper amount since
the instructions are usually quite general. Although the jury is instructed as
to thepurpose of the punitive award, the instructions in most instances pro-
vide no further information or suggestion as to the amount of money neces-
7. Collins v. Black, 380 So. 2d 241, 244 (Miss. 1980) (emphasis added).
8. In Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan and New Hampshire, the purpose of punitive damages
is not to punish, but to further compensate the injured plaintiff. 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
supra note 4, § 4.02-4.06 (1987).
9. For a review of jury instructions from various jurisdictions, see generally 1 J. GHIARDI &
J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, at ch. 11.
10. Wis. J.I. - Civil § 1707.
11. These issues arise where, for instance, multiple punitive damage awards are imposed for
the same conduct. If the defendant has already been punished by the imposition of punitive dam-
ages in a previous case arising out of the same tortious conduct, will not the imposition of another
award be superfluous, or as some have argued, constitute "overkill"? See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H.
Robins Co., 241 Kan. 441, -, 738 P.2d 1210, 1241-44 (1987); see also Brown v. Farkas, 158 Ill.
App. 3d 772, -, 511 N.W.2d 1143, 1147-48 (1987); Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 303, 294 N.W.2d at
459-60.
12. O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988); William Wilson Enter., Inc. v. Napier, 395 So. 2d 89 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981);
Commodore Corp. v. Bailey, 393 So. 2d 467, 471 (Miss. 1981).
13. 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 5.38, at 57 and § 11.18, at 14-15.
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sary to punish the defendant's conduct.14 Most instructions provide only
that the jury may consider the wealth of the defendant, the character of his
conduct, and the harm the plaintiff suffered in arriving at an appropriate
figure.15
D. Post-Trial Review
If the jury makes an award of punitive damages, that award is review-
able by the trial court on a post-trial motion. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts relies upon judicial control to avoid excessive punitive awards. "The
excessiveness of punitive damages in a case in which they are allowable may
be ground for reversal, for a new trial, or for a remittitur under the usual
rules by which the court controls the jury's award of compensatory
damages."16
The authority of the court (trial or appellate) to alter the award based
on excessiveness is extremely limited and "should be exercised with great
caution." 17 The court cannot alter the jury's award of punitive damages
simply because it is of the opinion that the jury awarded too much or too
little,1 8 and, in fact, has no authority to exercise its additur powers in most
jurisdictions."
As a general rule, an award of punitive damages will not be set aside or
changed unless the court finds that: (1) it was based on prejudice, passion
14. In criminal cases, where the judge determines the punishment, the legislatures have en-
acted guidelines for sentencing. See Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 241 (1985).
15. See supra note 9.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment d (1979).
17. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Washington, 420 So. 2d 14, 18 (1982) (quoting Carlisle v.
Miller, 275 Ala. 440, 444, 150 So. 2d 689, 692 (1963)).
18. Id. But see Johnston v. Brown, 290 S.C. 141, -, 348 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that it is enough if the judge deems the verdict to indicate undue liberality on the part of
the jury (citing Gray v. Davis, 247 S.C. 536, 148 S.E.2d 682 (1966))).
19. 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 18.01, at 3 n.10. But see Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278-79 (Miss. 1985) (citing Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 249 (Miss. 1977) (rule impliedly recognized)); Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263(6)
(1987) (doctrines of remittitur and additur shall apply to punitive damage awards).
Courts have said that the award should be enough to "smart," and is "properly denominated
'smart money'... designed to hurt in order to punish and deter." Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv.
Casualty Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978). Consequently, the wealthier the
defendant, the greater the sum of money necessary and appropriate to accomplish that purpose.
See also Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
1988]
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or bias;2" (2) it was based on a mistake of law or fact;2 1 (3) it lacked
evidentiary support;22 or (4) it shocked the judicial conscience.23
If a new trial is not warranted as a matter of right and the trial court
finds the verdict to be excessive, it may choose to exercise its remittitur
power.24 Only when the jury has abused its discretion by granting an award
that is clearly excessive may the court use that power.21 In choosing remit-
titur, the trial court must present the plaintiff with the option of either sub-
mitting to a new trial, usually on the issue of damages only, or of remitting
that part of the award that the court deems to have made it excessive.26
This choice is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reversed on
appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion.27
III. PUNISHMENT & DETERRENCE - FACT OR FICTION
The problem inherent in allowing a jury, in its discretion, to award pu-
nitive damages is that the award is not always reflective of the amount nec-
essary to punish and deter a particular defendant for a particular type of
conduct.28 The circumstances of each case must be considered to determine
whether the award in the particular instance serves the purposes of punitive
damages. 29 "An award which is more than necessary to serve its purposes
(punishment and deterrence) or which inflicts a penalty or burden on the
defendant which is disproportionate to the wrongdoing is excessive and is
contrary to public policy."3
20. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 220 (Colo. 1984). In some
states, if the trial court finds that the excessive verdict is the product of passion or prejudice, the
right to exercise remittitur may be precluded and a new trial ordered. Fahrenberg v. Tengel, 96
Wis. 2d 211, 223, 291 N.W.2d 516, 522 (1980).
21. See, eg., Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified on reh'g,
615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
22. See, e-g., Gilmer v. Playboy Club of Denver, Inc., 513 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1973).
23. See O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1448; Brink's, 546 F. Supp. 403; Binyon v. Nesseth, 231 Kan.
381, 646 P.2d 1043 (1982).
24. See generally 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 18.02, at 6.
25. Id. § 18.04, at 14; see also West v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 846 F.2d 387, 399 (7th
Cir. 1988).
26. See 2 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 18.04, at 7.
27. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Washington, 420 So. 2d 14, 17-18 (Ala. 1982); Carter-
Glogau Laboratories, Inc. v. Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz.
351, 736 P.2d 1163, 1170 (Ct. App. 1986); Olson v. Siordia, 25 Wis. 2d 274, 284-85, 130 N.W.2d
827, 833 (1964).
28. See generally Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133 (1982).
29. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 302, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459 (1980).
30. Id. at 303, 294 N.W.2d at 459.
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Punitive damage awards are increasingly becoming the focus of judicial
scrutiny. This indicates that the basis used by juries in determining the
award may be flawed, and merits reconsideration. The problem is exacer-
bated by the lack of any uniform consensus for testing the excessiveness of a
punitive award. In the first instance, it is difficult to set an appropriate
award to punish and deter, and on review, ".... [i]t is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to lay down precise rules of law to determine whether an award of
punitive damages is excessive."31
A. Judicial Review - Application of Traditional Standards
Most courts confine their review of the excessiveness of a punitive award
to: (1) whether the amount of the award "shocks the judicial conscience,"
or (2) reflects "passion or prejudice" on the part of the jury. These broad
parameters may allow an award which may not reflect the appropriate
amount necessary for punishment and deterrence.
A recent report indicates that there are different types of tort litigation,
each with its own distinct class of litigants, attorneys and legal dynamics.32
These same dynamics affect punitive damage awards. Large damage
awards are becoming increasingly common in commercial,33 civil rights,34
defamation35 and insurance bad faith cases.36 For courts, particularly with
respect to contract-related cases, this means that the excessiveness issue has
moved outside the area of personal injury, where according to one court,
"there is justification for imposition of substantial punitive damage
awards,"37 to cases involving contract-related disputes like fraud and tor-
tious interference with contract.
31. Tetuan v. A.H. Robins, 241 Kan. 441, _, 738 P.2d 1210, 1238 (1987).
32. D. HENSLER, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS
(1987) (Rand, The Institute for Civil Justice) (Special Report R-3583-ICJ).
33. Dees v. Allied Fidelity Ins. Co., 655 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
34. Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1987).
35. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983) (jury
award of $1.3 million remitted to $150,000 by appellate court).
36. See Dependable Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514 So. 2d 804 (Ala. 1987); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050 (Ala. 1987); Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala.
1981); Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 518 So. 2d 1189 (Miss. 1987).
37. Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 546 F. Supp. 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also M.
PETERSON, S. SARMA & M. SHANLEY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES - EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987)
(Rand, The Institute for Civil Justice) (R-3331-ICJ). The authors found that personal injury cases
were less likely to result in punitive awards than contract disputes and intentional tort suits, and
that the awards in personal injury cases were modest. Id.
1988]
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The excessiveness of the punitive damage award was the focus of judi-
cial scrutiny in Hawkins v. Allstate Insurance Co..38 In this case, the jury
awarded $3.5 million for the insurer's first party bad faith. The insurance
company had refused to replace its insured's car with one of comparable
value after the insured's auto had been destroyed. The court found that
$3.5 million in punitive damages was neither excessive nor unreasonable, in
light of the circumstances, so as to show the influence of "passion or preju-
dice."39 It reasoned that since the jury could have concluded that the com-
pany had engaged in this type of deceptive claims practice for up to
eighteen years, and since the amount of the award was not disproportionate
to the company's financial position, the verdict was reasonable.'
Similarly, in the case of Banker's Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,41 a
jury assessed $1.6 million in punitive damages against a health and accident
insurer for failure to pay a $20,000 claim for the accidental loss of a right
leg. The court stated:
While no hard and fast rule may be laid down with regard to the
maximum amount of punitive damages which may be awarded in a
given case, it is difficult to imagine that.., the judicial conscience
could be shocked by a punitive damage assessment which is less than
one percent of the financial net worth of the defendant.42
The emphasis in both cases was primarily on economic aspects, including
the wealth of the defendant. The question of whether the award was appro-
priate for the punishment and deterrence of the defendant was not even
considered.
B. Product Liability Cases
To further complicate the excessiveness issue, courts are often faced
with product liability cases involving a large number of injured persons giv-
ing rise to the potential for multiple punitive awards.4 3 An excellent exam-
ple of this situation arose in the case of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,'
where the jury awarded $125 million in punitive damages for the defective
design of a Ford Pinto. The trial judge reduced this award to $3.5 million.
In cases such as these, juries are in a poor position to effectuate the dual
purposes of punitive damages and judges are hampered as well. The case of
38. 733 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1987).
39. Id. at 1084.
40. Id. at 1085.
41. 483 So. 2d 254 (1985), aff'd, 108 S.Ct. 1645 (1988).
42. Mt at 279.
43. See generally Seltzer, supra note 1.
44. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
[Vol. 72:33
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O'Gilvie Y. International Playtex, Inc.45 illustrates this point. O'Gilvie was a
toxic shock syndrome case in which the jury awarded $10 million in puni-
tive damages. Under both federal and Kansas law, remittitur is not proper
unless the amount of damages awarded is so excessive that it "shocks the
judicial conscience.""4 The trial judge stated on the record that the amount
of the punitive award did not shock his conscience or raise any inference of
passion or prejudice, but that he would consider the defendant's post-ver-
dict conduct as -a factor.47 The court ordered a remittitur on what the ap-
pellate court stated to be a totally improper basis from outside the record.4"
On appeal, given the trial judge's comments, the court had no other choice
than to reinstate the verdict.49
[W]e are compelled to point out that the court's order subverts the
goals of punishment and deterrence that underlie the assessment of
punitive damages in Kansas. Far from punishing Playtex, the trial
court here rewarded the company for continuing its tortious conduct
long enough to use it as a bargaining chip in the remittitur
proceedings. 50
The issue of the propriety of granting a remittitur also arose in the case
of Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co. 51 Tetuan was another product liability case
involving the much litigated Dalkon Shield. The inter-uterine device
caused the plaintiff to contract pelvic inflammatory disease and become
sterile. The evidence showed that A.H. Robins Co. knew of the danger of
its product, but fraudulently concealed those defects. The jury found for
the plaintiff and awarded compensatory damages in the sum of $1.75 mil-
lion and $7.5 million in punitive damages.52 In the light of the evidence and
the financial status of the defendant, the appellate court found that the
award did not "shock the collective conscience" of the court.53
The question is, was this the appropriate amount to punish and deter
the defendant, or had A.H. Robins Co. already been "punished enough"?
A.H. Robins Co. raised this issue on appeal and argued that its potential
liability for punitive damages in similar cases should have been considered
45. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S.Ct. 2014 (1988).
46. Id. at 1448.
47. Id.
48. Id. The court assured counsel for Playtex that substantial modification or complete re-
mittitur would be forthcoming if Playtex should decide to remove its superabsorbent tampons
from the market. Id.
49. Id. at 1450.
50. Id.
51. 241 Kan. 441, 738 P.2d 1210 (1987).
52. Id. at -' 738 P.2d at 1215.
53. Id. at -, 738 P.2d at 1240.
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in reducing the punitive award in Tetuan. 4 While recognizing that other
punitive damage claims constitute relevant evidence which may be intro-
duced at trial, the appellate court found that since A.H. Robins Co. made a
"calculated tactical decision" not to introduce that evidence at trial, it
would not consider it on appeal.
The court noted that there are other protections, such as bifurcated tri-
als, to avoid the prejudicial effect of offering evidence of exposure to other
punitive awards in a trial with liability potential of this magnitude.56 The
court, caught up in procedural technicalities, failed to evaluate the punish-
ment and deterrent functions of the award in light of the totality of the
circumstances of the case. Thus, although the award in a particular case
may be appropriate and reasonable, problems will arise if courts and jurors
fail to keep in perspective the goals of a punitive damage award.
C. Refocusing Attention on the Purposes of Punitive Damages
At post-trial or on appeal, the court must be able to point to some bla-
tant abuse in order to justify amending the jury verdict, but the standards
for finding abuse are at times meaningless.57 The Nevada Supreme Court
reviewed this issue in the context of an $800,000 punitive award against the
sellers of a car rental business for breach of contract and fraud. 8 The court
addressed solely the issue of the excessiveness of punitive damages and
reached the conclusion that the award was clearly disproportionate to the
guilt and culpability of the tortfeasor.5 9
In so doing, the court criticized the traditional standards for judging the
reasonableness of punitive damage awards, noting with particularity that
the "proper end of punitive damages is to punish and deter culpable con-
duct."' In an effort to determine the excessiveness of this award, the court
found the "shock the conscience" and "passion or prejudice" tests wholly
inadequate.61
No effort has ever been made to define the judicial conscience nor to
describe how or under what circumstances it might be shocked...
[W]e seek to formulate a more intelligible and less esoteric standard
54. Id. at - 738 P.2d at 1241.
55. Id. at - 738 P.2d at 1244.
56. Id. at - 738 P.2d at 1242-44 (citing Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187
(1984) and Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing puni-
tive damages overkill)).
57. Ace Truck and Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 746 P.2d 132 (Nev. 1987).
58. Id. at 133.
59. Id. at 137-38.
60. Id. at 134.
61. Id. at 135.
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than one derived from a judicial manifestation of that indistinct little
voice, the inward monitor of right and wrong known as
conscience. 62
The court then adopted a standard based on reasonableness and fairness,
stating:
Punitive damages are legally excessive when the amount of damages
awarded is clearly disproportionate to the degree of blameworthiness
and harmfulness inherent in the oppressive, fraudulent or malicious
misconduct of the tortfeasor under the circumstances of a given
case. If the awarding jury or judge assesses more in punitive dam-
ages than is reasonably necessary and fairly deserved in order to
punish the offender and deter others from similar conduct, then the
award must be set aside as excessive.63
The largest punitive damage award to date, in the amount of $3 billion,
involved tortious interference with a contract in the case of Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co. 61 With no discussion of "shocked consciences" or "passion or
prejudice," a Texas appeals court found that considering the type of action,
the conduct involved, and the need for deterrence, the punitive damages
were excessive and the trial court abused its discretion in not suggesting a
remittitur. The court stated, "[t]here is a point where punitive damages
may overstate their purpose and serve to confiscate rather than to deter or
punish."65 The award was remitted to $2 billion.66
Punishment and deterrence were the focus of the court's scrutiny in
Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York,67 where the jury made an award of $5
million in punitive damages. The city sued Brink's for negligence and
breach of an agreement to collect coins deposited in the city's parking me-
ters. The court contrasted the case to the product liability type cases and
noted that there is little prospect that repetitive conduct will occur and in-
jure others and "the resulting injury,... is to property - the loss of money,
not death or severe personal injury."'68 The court expressed concern while
reducing the award to $1.5 million: "[T]here are limits beyond which a jury
should not be permitted to go. It is the duty of the court to keep a verdict
for punitive damages within reasonable bounds considering the purpose to
62. Id.
63. Id. at 136-37 (footnote omitted).
64. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). The case was eventually settled.
65. Id. at 866.
66. Id.
67. 546 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
68. Id. at 414.
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be achieved as well as the mala fides of the defendant in the particular
case."
69
The Montana Supreme Court found that a $5 million punitive award in
a bad faith case was "exorbitant" and ordered a remittitur to $1 million.70
The court stated: "Punitive damages are an extraordinary remedy, outside
of the field of usual redressful remedies, and should be applied with caution,
lest gendered by passion and prejudice because of the defendant's wrongdo-
ing, the award becomes unrealistic or unreasonable." 7
1
An Illinois appellate court remitted a jury award of $1 million in puni-
tive damages against a defamation defendant who submitted a false report
of suspected child abuse. The court found that where $50,000 in compensa-
tory damages was awarded, $50,000 in punitive damages was sufficient to
punish the defendant and deter others from committing similar offenses.72
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Illinois law, used a
three-factor analysis to uphold a $2 million punitive award where the com-
pensatory damage award was $3 million: "(1) the nature and enormity of
the wrong; (2) the financial status of the defendant; and (3) the potential
liability of the defendant resulting from multiple claims. '7 3 The court
stated that in addition to the Illinois factors, federal law required the court
to determine if the jury's finding was inconsistent with awards in analogous
cases.
These cases reflect a trend among the courts to review the excessiveness
issue and to take a more objective look at the purpose of punitive damages.
Courts are realizing that juries are making inappropriate or uneducated as-
sessments of the punitive damages amount. There comes a point at which a
punitive award is just "too much" to properly serve the purposes of punish-
ment and deterrence.
IV. REFORM
Courts, legislatures and commentators are beginning to recognize the
need for tighter judicial control over punitive damage awards.74 As a re-
sult, many modifications are being made to the common law rules.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 226-27.
71. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Ellinghouse, 725 P.2d 217, 226-27 (Mont. 1986).
72. Brown v. Farkas, 158 Ill. App. 3d 772, 511 N.E.2d 1143 (1987).
73. West v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 846 F.2d 387, 399 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Product Liability
Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 96 (1985-86); Seltzer, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 2, at 997.
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A. Courts
In Rowlett v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,71 a $3 million punitive damage ver-
dict was found to be grossly excessive and was reduced on appeal to
$300,000. The court questioned whether the employer's conduct "war-
ranted $3 million worth of outrage," and expressed concern over the appro-
priate level of punitive damage awards in general.76
The court mandated that in future cases the trial courts should instruct
jurors that if they grant punitive damages, in determining the amount to be
granted, "they should engage in a balancing test taking into consideration
such factors as the grievousness of the conduct, the solvency of the guilty
party, and the potential for deterrence of the verdict. '77
The Rowlett case demonstrates one approach to dealing with the prob-
lem of excessive or unreasonable punitive damage awards. Excessive ver-
dicts create a dilemma for appellate courts since remand requires a retrial
on the punitive damage issue, all of which places a costly burden on the
parties and the courts. The Rowlett court urged trial courts to exercise
greater control over jury verdicts by using the balancing factors cited.78
Courts have adopted jury instructions intended to focus on the punish-
ment and deterrence aspects of punitive damage awards. Under the Wis-
consin Civil Jury Instructions, in nonproduct cases, the jury is instructed to
consider the grievousness of the conduct; the degree of malice or reckless-
ness; the actual and potential damage caused; and the defendant's ability to
pay.79 In product cases, however, the jury is instructed to consider the seri-
ousness of the hazard to the public; the profitability of the misconduct; the
defendant's conduct on discovery of the misconduct; the degree of aware-
ness of the hazard; the particular employees involved; the duration of the
conduct; concealment if any; the financial condition and the effect of a par-
ticular judgment; and finally, the total punishment the defendant will re-
ceive from other sources.80
The listed factors, particularly in product cases, will give defendants the
opportunity to introduce evidence which will better enable the jury to focus
on the punishment and deterrence aspects of punitive damages. Similar in-
structions should be used in bad faith, commercial, contractual and mass
tort cases. The problem with this approach is that it allows for the intro-
75. 832 F.2d 194 (1st. Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 206-07.
77. Id. at 207.
78. Id.
79. Wis. J.I. - Civil § 1707.
80. Wis. J.I. - Civil § 1707A.
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duction of evidence extraneous to the principal focus of the case, to-wit,
liability. It places a defendant in the position of proving why he or she
should pay less punitive damages, while at the same time defending against
punitive damage liability in the first instance.
B. Legislative Reform
Legislative reform of punitive damages is increasing and many of the
reforms are focusing on the control of awards. For instance, the Missouri
legislature requires a bifurcated trial before the same jury on the issue of
liability and the amount of punitive damages. It has also attempted to
avoid the problem that arises with respect to multiple awards. "[A] defend-
ant may file a post-trial motion requesting the amount awarded by the jury
as punitive damages be credited by the court with amounts previously paid
by the defendant for punitive damages arising out of the same conduct on
which the imposition of punitive damages is based."'"
The Connecticut legislature has enacted a statute which requires that
once the trier of fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded
in a product liability action, the court shall determine the amount, not to
exceed twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff. 2
Some states have chosen to limit punitive damage awards by providing
for a maximum amount subject to specified exceptions. Alabama limits pu-
nitive damages to $250,000 unless the award is based on a pattern or prac-
tice of intentional wrongful conduct, or conduct involving actual malice
other than fraud or bad faith.83 In Texas, except for damages from malice
or intentional torts, the amount of punitive damages may not exceed four
times the amount of actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater.8 4
Colorado has limited the amount of exemplary damages to an amount
equal to the actual damages.85 Colorado also provides that the court is able
to reduce the amount of punitives if the deterrent effect of the damages has
already been accomplished, the conduct which resulted in the award has
ceased, or the purpose of punitive damages has otherwise been served. In
addition, the statute also provides that the court may increase the amount
of punitives to three times the amount of actual damages if the plaintiff
proves that the defendant has continued the wrongful conduct that is the
81. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.263(4) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN."§ 52-240b (West Supp. 1988). Punitive damages in Connecticut
are compensatory and may not exceed the expenses of litigation. See 1 J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 4, § 4.03.
83. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (Supp. 1988).
84. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
85. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987).
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subject matter of the punitive damage claim, or that the defendant has acted
willfully and wantonly during the pendency of the action. 6
In Virginia, the total amount of punitive damages shall not exceed
$350,000.87 In Georgia, the amount of punitive damages is limited to
$250,000 except in product liability or intentional tort claims.88 Florida has
limited punitive damages to three times the amount of compensatory dam-
ages awarded to each person. 9 Two exceptions to this limitation are class
actions or if, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the
plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that the award is not
excessive.
In Oklahoma, the punitive damage award may not exceed the amount
of actual damages, unless, as the statute provides, "there is clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant is guilty of conduct evincing a wanton
or reckless disregard for the rights of another, oppression, fraud or malice
.... "90 Montana allows a reasonable award in cases of actual fraud or
actual malice.91
In Kansas, exemplary or punitive damages are determined by the court
in a separate proceeding after a finding of liability, and are limited to the
lesser of the highest annual gross income earned by the defendant over the
past five years or five million dollars. However, if the court finds that the
profitability of the defendant's misconduct exceeds or is expected to exceed
this limitation, the amount of punitive damages shall be an amount equal to
one and one half times the amount of profit which the defendant gained or
is expected to gain as a result of the misconduct.92 In Ohio, the amount of
punitive damages is determined by the court in product liability cases.93
In Kentucky, the trier of fact is to consider the likelihood of serious
harm, the awareness of such likelihood by the defendant, the profitability of
the misconduct, the duration of the misconduct, concealment thereof and
any actions to remedy the misconduct.94 Other legislative reforms include
requiring a higher standard of proof, allowing a bifurcation of the trial, and
awarding part of the amount to some type of state entity.95
86. Id.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1988).
88. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (1987).
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(c) (West Supp. 1988).
90. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987).
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1987).
92. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (Supp. 1987).
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
94. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. STATS. § 411.186 (Baldwin 1988).
95. See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KiRCHER, supra note 4, §§ 5.44, 6.38, 9.11, 9.12 and 10.01; Aus-
ness, supra note 74.
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V. AN EXPANDED JUDICIAL ROLE
The reforms enacted by the courts and the legislatures will help to pro-
duce more equitable and uniform awards, but a more basic reform is re-
quired. Allowing the judiciary to exercise complete control over the size of
punitive damage awards would work to achieve the dual purpose of puni-
tive damages, and reduce the potential for abuse. Since punitive damages
have essentially the same purpose as criminal sanctions - punishment and
deterrence - it would be reasonable to allow the judge in a post-trial hear-
ing to set the amount of punitive damages. The judge could, after liability
for punitives has been determined by the jury, consider any and all of the
factors necessary to tailor an appropriate punishment for a particular de-
fendant in a controlled environment where the parties could introduce any
relevant information applicable to the amount of damages to be awarded.
Kansas has taken a step in this direction, but the factors to be considered by
the court are still too limited.96
This approach would allow a judge, who has at his disposal greater ex-
perience and knowledge in determining a reasonable amount of money ade-
quate to punish and deter, to make the original assessment of the amount of
the award, instead of having to remit it. This approach would also prevent
the introduction of potentially prejudicial evidence such as the amount and
number of other punitive verdicts, and the wealth of the defendant from
influencing the issue of liability. In addition, it would eliminate the waste-
ful costs of a new trial, and also the problem faced by defendants defending
against liability in the first instance, while also having to introduce evidence
as to his or her wealth and profitability at the same time.
Legislation that would give the trial court alone the power to determine
the amount of a punitive damage award after the jury has determined that
the defendant's conduct merits such an award is an idea whose time has
come.97 The issue is one of legislative and judicial policy. A jury finding of
the amount of a punitive award is not one of "constitutional dimensions."'g
Shifting the initial responsibility for the amount of punitive damages to the
trial court, subject to review by the appellate court as to any abuse of discre-
tion, would make the awards more reflective of their dual purpose - pun-
ishment and deterrence.
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3701 (1987).
97. Bell & Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1987).
98. Prentice, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7 LITIGATION
113 (1988); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA.
L.REv. 269 (1983).
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